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THE COST OF INDEFINITELY KICKING THE CAN: WHY CONTINUED 
“PROLONGED” DETENTION IS NO SOLUTION TO GUANTÁNAMO
Devon Chaffee*
On January 22, 2009 President Barack Obama committed to close the 
Guantánamo Bay detention facilities and established a process for 
reviewing the cases of the remaining detainees. In a May, the President 
indicated that this review would result in a “fifth category” of detainees 
who the administration would not seek to prosecute in U.S. courts or 
transfer or repatriate to other countries, but who would be kept in 
“prolonged” detention. This essay argues that continued indefinite 
detention of the detainees currently held at Guantánamo Bay threatens to 
undermine the imperative security and foreign policy objectives that the 
closure of the detention facility would otherwise achieve. Continuing to kick 
the cases of a category of detainees down the road for indefinite, repeated 
review will impede efforts to close the door on the legacy of flawed 
detention policies that the Guantánamo facilities have come to represent.
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 22, 2009, President Barack Obama issued an executive 
order that laid out strong guidance for closing the Guantánamo Bay deten-
tion facility.1 The order launched a case-by-case review of the Guantánamo 
detainees led by the Justice Department, emphasized civilian courts as the 
appropriate forum for criminal trials, and underscored the importance of 
diplomatic efforts to facilitate the transfer and release of detainees.2
Since January 22, and despite allegations about the lack of a cohe-
sive plan and President’s announcement that it will not meet the one year 
deadline, the Obama administration has made measureable progress towards 
closing the facility. As of November 24, the number of detainees in U.S. 
custody in Guantánamo has dropped from approximately two-hundred forty 
These 
provisions inspired hope that Guantánamo’s legacy of illegal detention and 
ill-treatment could be brought to end in a manner that would restore confi-
dence in American justice and in the U.S. as a country committed to uphold-
ing the rule of law.
* Advocacy Counsel at Human Rights First.
1 Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,897 (Jan. 22, 2009).
2 Id. at 4,899.
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to two-hundred fifteen.3 The President has announced the transfer of the 
five alleged conspirators in the 9/11 attacks and one detainee, Ahmed Gui-
liani, has been transferred and is being prosecuted in the Southern District 
of New York.4 Dozens of other cases have reportedly been referred to pros-
ecutors for trials before district courts and the Senate and the House have 
recently voted in favor of allowing these detainees to be brought to the U.S. 
to stand trial.5 Nineteen additional detainees have been repatriated or trans-
ferred to other countries, with six European governments receiving or agree-
ing to receive detainees.6 In June, the European Union (EU) members is-
sued a joint statement with the U.S. setting forth a framework for the trans-
fer of detainees cleared for release to European allies willing to help the 
U.S. “turn the page . . . in a manner that comports with the rule of law.”7
Notwithstanding progress in civilian court prosecutions, repatria-
tion, and transfer of those held at Guantánamo, President Obama announced 
at the National Archives Building in May his intention to continue to inde-
finitely detain some prisoners without trial after the January deadline for 
3 Associated Press, Guantanamo by the Numbers, http://www.miamiherald.com/news/
world/AP/story/1332285.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2009).
4 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Announces Forum Decisions for 
Guantanamo Detainees (Nov. 13, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/
2009/ag-speech-091113.html. 
5 See Gitmo Cases Referred to U.S. Prosecutors, CBS NEWS, Aug. 3, 2009,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/08/03/national/main5208364.shtml; U.S. HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, ROLL CALL VOTE NUMBER 746 (Oct. 1, 2009); U.S. SENATE ROLL CALL 
VOTE NUMBER 00038 (Nov. 5, 2009).
6 See David Johnston, Uighurs Leave Guantánamo for Palau, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2009,
at A22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/01/world/asia/01uighurs.html?_r=1; 
Peter Finn, Administration Makes Progress on Resettling Detainees, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 
2009, at A03; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United States Transfers Two Guantanamo 
Bay Detainees to the Government of Portugal (Aug. 28, 2009), available at http://www.
justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/August/09-ag-892.html; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United 
States Transfers Guantanamo Bay Detainee to Afghanistan (Aug. 24, 2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/August/09-ag-837.html; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, United States Transfers Three Guantanamo Detainees to the Kingdom of Saudi Ara-
bia (June 12, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/June/09-ag-587.html; 
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United States Transfers Two Guantanamo Detainees to 
Foreign Nations (June 11, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/June/
09-ag-580.html; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United States Transfers Lakhdar Bou-
mediene to France (May 15, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/May/
09-ag-477.html. 
7 Press Release, Council of the European Union, Joint Statement of the European Union 
and its Member States and the United States of America on the Closure of the Guantanamo 
Bay Detention Facility and Future Counterterrorism Cooperation (June 11, 2009), availa-
ble at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/108455.pdf 
[hereinafter Council of the EU].
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closing the detention facility.8 The President described the potential scope 
of such detention to include those currently detained who the administration 
asserts cannot be prosecuted—some he admitted due to “tainted evi-
dence”—and who the administration does not want to release because they 
pose a security threat.9
To allow Guantánamo detainees to continue to languish in U.S. cus-
tody without trial, however, will jeopardize the very national security and 
foreign policy objectives that the administration is looking to achieve by 
closing the facility.10 Putting detainees into indefinite detention in a new 
facility will simply serve to transfer the problem, not solve it, kicking the 
most difficult cases down the road for repeated review11
II. ACHIEVING U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY GOALS IN 
CLOSING GUANTÁNAMO
and protracted liti-
gation. Such a scheme would also risk tainting the legitimacy of U.S. detai-
nee operations in theaters of armed conflict by potentially sparking fears 
that the mistakes at Guantánamo may be repeated. If the U.S. is to truly turn 
the page on past detention policy, the Obama administration must continue 
to vigorously pursue options for implementing its commitment to closing 
Guantánamo in a manner that fully comports with fundamental principles of 
justice and the rule of law.
The most oft cited reasons by current and former government offi-
cials for closing Guantánamo is the damage that Guantánamo detention 
policies have had on the reputation of the U.S. and on U.S. counterinsur-
gency and counterterrorism efforts. Intelligence experts, diplomats, military 
leaders, former Secretaries of Defense, and former Secretaries of State all 
recognize that the Guantánamo legacy has hurt our relationships with our 
allies and our counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts.12
8 See President Barack Obama, Remarks on National Security (May 21, 2009), avail-
able at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-On-National-
Security-5-21-09/ [hereinafter Remarks on National Security].
In January, 
Dennis Blair, then the nominee for Director of National Intelligence testi-
fied, “I agree with the President that the detention center at Guantanamo has 
become a damaging symbol to the world and that it must be closed. It is a 
9 Id.
10 Id. 
11 Testimony of Attorney General Eric Holder Before the Senate Judiciary Committee
(Nov. 18, 2009) (“There would be continuous reviews, as I said to make sure that person’s 
detention—continued detention —was appropriate.”) (on file with author).
12 Dennis Blair, Statement Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 7 (Jan. 22, 
2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20090122_testimony.pdf; Thom Shank-
er, Gates Counters Putin’s Words on U.S. Power, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2007, at A6, availa-
ble at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/12/world/europe/12gates.html. 
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rallying cry for terrorist recruitment and harmful to our national security, so 
closing it is important for our national security.”13
If the administration continues to indefinitely detain Guantánamo 
detainees without trial or charge, it risks prolonging the legacy of flawed 
and illegal detention policies that Guantánamo has come to symbolize. One 
week before the President’s National Archive speech, three retired senior 
military leaders wrote the President stating that attempting to establish a 
system of indefinite detention without trial would perpetuate “the harmful 
symbolism of Guantánamo, undermining our counterterrorism efforts and 
squandering an opportunity to demonstrate the strength of the American 
system of justice.”14
The Guantánamo detentions have shown that assessments of dangerous-
ness based not on overt acts, as in a criminal trial, but on association are 
unreliable and will inevitably lead to costly mistakes. This is precisely
why national security preventive detention schemes have proven a dismal 
failure in other countries. The potential gains from such schemes are simp-
ly not great enough to warrant departure from hundreds of years of west-
ern criminal justice traditions.
The letter goes on to state: 
15
The military leaders recognize the disagreeable company that the 
U.S. keeps when engaging in indefinite detention without trial. U.S. allies in 
Europe have implemented no comparable long term detention scheme in 
armed conflict or administrative preventive detention outside of the deporta-
tion context.16 The governments of countries in Egypt, Malaysia, Zim-
babwe, and Kenya have authorized indefinite or successive detention 
schemes in the name of fighting threats from terrorists or insurgents and all 
those schemes have resulted in violations of fundamental due process 
norms.17
13 Blair, supra note 12.
In response to this criticism, such governments have cited Guantá-
namo Bay detention policies to justify repressive schemes of prolonged 
14 Letter from Vice Admiral Lee F. Gunn, Rear Admiral John D. Hutson, and Brigadier 
General James P. Cullen to President Barack Obama (May 14, 2009), available at http://
www.humanrightsfirst.org/pdf/090515-etn-opp-mil-camp.pdf.
15 Id. at 2.
16 Hearing on the Legal, Moral and National Security Consequences of Prolonged Deten-
tion: Before Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 
(2009) (statement of Sarah H. Cleveland, Professor of Human and Constitutional Rights, 
Columbia Law School), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=
3896.
17 See PREVENTIVE DETENTION AND SECURITY LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (Andrew 
Harding & John Hatchard eds. 1993); INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, EMINENT 
JURISTS PANEL ON TERRORISM, COUNTER-TERRORISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, ASSESSING 
DAMAGE, URGING ACTION: REPORT ON TERRORISM, COUNTER-TERRORISM AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS (2009), available at news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/16_02_09_ejp_report.pdf.
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detention without trial—schemes that the U.S. criticizes as authorized arbi-
trary detention.18
Indefinite detention regimes aimed at preventing security risks are 
known to foster human rights abuses and to create perverse incentives 
against bringing criminal charges against prisoners. That is why the U.S. 
has been consistently critical of governments that detain indefinitely without 
charge, including regimes that involve successive review or unrestrained 
renewable time limits.19
The world is watching to see whether the Obama administration ful-
fills its promise to close Guantánamo, but also to see how it faces the diffi-
cult questions that must be confronted to truly resolve the detainee cases 
and not simply move them elsewhere. If the handling of the former Guantá-
namo detainees falls short of the standards that U.S. allies expect, those 
allies are likely to have continuing concerns about cooperating with the U.S. 
in joint detention operations. Moreover, if our European allies perceive that 
the process afforded some of the Guantánamo detainees falls short of inter-
national standards, they will be less likely to continue to offer their much 
needed assistance in relocating other detainees. When the Council for the 
EU expressed support for receiving Guantánamo detainees it did so with the 
explicit understanding that the underlying policy issues would be addressed 
in a manner consistent with international law, presumably as that law is 
understood not just by the U.S. but also by EU member states.
If the Obama administration continues to pursue a 
detention regime for former Guantánamo detainees that permits indefinite 
detention without charge, it will impact detention policies of governments 
throughout the world and will likely embolden other governments to 
circumvent the protections guaranteed in criminal trials by citing security 
concerns.
20
In his speech in May, the President spoke of continued detention at 
Guantánamo as a system to “hold individuals to keep them from carrying 
out an act of war . . . .”21
18 See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, DEFENDING SECURITY: THE RIGHT TO DEFEND RIGHTS IN AN 
AGE OF TERRORISM 8 (2004), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/defenders/
hrd_global/Defending_Security_Draft.pdf (quoting Malaysian Minister of Justice Dr. Rais 
Yatim, in Rais: Sept. 11 Rendered Consultation on Terror Laws Impossible, MALAYSIAKINI,
Dec. 12, 2003, http://malaysiakini.com/news/18103 (last visited Nov. 7, 2009)); U.S. DEP’T
OF STATE, 2008 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: MALAYSIA (Feb. 25, 2009), available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eap/119046.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2009). 
But the continued indefinite detention of Guantá-
19 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2008 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: SINGAPORE (Feb. 25, 
2009), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eap/119056.htm (last visited 
Nov. 24, 2009); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2008 INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT: MALAYSIA
(2008), available at http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/ifd/2008/101777.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 
2009).
20 Council of the EU, supra note 7.
21 Remarks on National Security, supra note 8. 
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namo detainees under the auspices of a law of war framework is in stark 
contrast to past examples of U.S. armed conflict detention or current deten-
tion policies in Iraq or Afghanistan. In previous conflicts, the U.S. afforded 
prisoners the procedures proscribed in the Geneva Conventions22 and U.S. 
military regulation23 at the point of capture and it released or transferred the 
prisoners promptly upon the end of the conflict.24 The prisoners currently 
held at Guantánamo were afforded no review at the point of capture, and 
many were held for over two years before any process was provided. As 
Lawrence Wilkerson, Colin Powell’s chief of staff recently wrote, “no mea-
ningful attempt at discrimination was made in-country by competent offi-
cials, civilian or military, as to who we were transporting to Cuba for deten-
tion and interrogation.”25
III. STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES FOR PERPETUATING A GLOBAL 
INDEFINITE DETENTION SCHEME
That many of the Guantánamo detainees were 
denied process at the point of capture and that they have already been de-
tained for such an extended period of time increases the importance of en-
suring that the cases are dealt with in a manner that is consistent with the 
approach of our allies and with American traditions of justice. A policy that 
involves continued indefinite detention without charge falls short of what is 
needed to repair the damage inflicted on U.S. diplomatic power and ability 
to champion human rights abroad. 
Guantánamo was a key instrument in the Bush administration’s ef-
fort to wage a “Global War on Terror” which involved asserting a global 
authority to bring individuals into U.S. custody regardless of their place of 
capture. In exploiting this global detention authority, the Bush administra-
tion’s policies demonstrated a disregard not only for international law, but 
also for the domestic laws of other countries in a manner that provoked out-
rage from the international community. In the context of the congressional 
22 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 5, Aug. 12, 1949, 
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
23 U.S. ARMY, ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR, RETAINED PERSONNEL, CIVILIAN INTERNEES 
AND OTHER DETAINEES, AR 190-8 (1997), available at http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/
pdf/r190_8.pdf . 
24 See, e.g., No. 1991 Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of 
America and France on Repatriation and Liberation of Prisoners of War (Mar. 1947), availa-
ble at http://untreaty.un.org/unts/1_60000/4/25/00007208.pdf (laying out a rate of repatria-
tion of German prisoners of war at a rate of twenty thousand a month that would be com-
pleted by October 1, 1947). 
25 Posting of Lawrence Wilkerson to the Washington Note (Mar. 17, 2009 19:27), http://
www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/2009/03/some_truths_abo/ (last visited Nov. 24, 
2009).
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debate, the Obama administration has expressed an interest not only in con-
tinued detention of Guantánamo detainees, but also in considering statutory 
authority for long-term law of war detention beyond the Guantánamo con-
text.26
The U.S. counterinsurgency manual, updated in 2006, makes clear 
the importance of criminalizing insurgent behavior and grounding counte-
rinsurgency efforts not only in U.S. domestic and international law, but also 
in the laws of the host nation. The manual states: 
Continuing to pursue a global detention policy that ignores the rele-
vant domestic legal, political, and strategic framework will prolong the 
problems caused by the detentions at Guantánamo and by the Bush adminis-
tration’s “Global War on Terror.”
When insurgents are seen as criminals they lose public support; if they are 
dealt with by an established legal system in line with local culture and 
practices, the legitimacy of the host government is enhanced . . . . 
[P]articipation in counterinsurgency operations by United States forces 
must be pursuant to United States law, which includes domestic laws and 
international treaties to which the United States is party as well as certain 
laws of the host nation.27
The Obama administration has initiated many reforms in detention policy in 
Afghanistan and Iraq that recognize the importance of ensuring that U.S. 
detainee operations are seen as legitimate and lawful under international and 
governing domestic law. In Afghanistan, the Department of Defense has 
announced new procedures for detainees held at the Bagram Theater In-
ternment Facility that take into consideration Afghan-run rehabilitation pro-
grams and the option of transfer to Afghan custody for prosecution.28 While 
these procedures fall short of establishing a clear domestic legal framework 
for U.S. detention operations in Afghanistan, they recognize the importance 
of tailoring detainee operations in order to reduce recidivism and win the 
support of the local population.29
26 H. Armed Services Comm. Hearing on Reforming the Military Commissions Act of 2006 
and Detainee Policy (2009) (opening statement of Chairman Ike Skelton), available at 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/House-Armed-Services-July-24-2009.pdf.
Likewise, in Iraq the U.S. military contin-
ues to release and transfer detainees at a reported rate of approximately sev-
en hundred and fifty a month as provided for in the Strategic Framework 
27 U.S. ARMY/MARINE CORPS COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL 1-19 (2006), available 
at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24fd.pdf.
28 See Brief for Respondents-Appellants at 11, Al Maqaleh v. Gates, No. 09-5265 (D.C. 
Cir. 2009), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/US-
Bagram-brief-9-14-09.pdf.
29 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, COMISAF INITIAL ASSESSMENT (UNCLASSIFIED) 26–27, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/21/AR2009
092100110.html (declassified on Sept. 21, 2009).
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Agreement that came into effect on January 1st.30 On September 16, the 
U.S. military announced the closure of the U.S. maintained prison camp 
Camp Bucca, once the largest prisons in Iraq, transferring all remaining 
detainees to Iraqi prisons.31
Codifying a global system of U.S. detention would inevitably re-
strict the ability of the U.S. to ensure that U.S. detention policies adhere to 
domestic legal requirements and strategic needs in countries where the U.S. 
is engaged in armed conflict. A detention scheme that purports to provide 
procedures for all U.S. detentions operations worldwide will complicate 
efforts to ensure that the detention practices on the ground are consistent 
with the laws of the host nation and perceived as legitimate by the local 
population. For instance, the scheme for armed conflict detention proposed 
by the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2008 made no reference to the 
importance of involving the domestic government or considering the appli-
cable domestic law.32 The provision, if adopted, would also have mandated 
access only to a U.S. adjudicatory system even where access to review be-
fore a domestic body or a hybrid system that incorporates representation 
from the domestic government would have been more appropriate.33
The consequences of the codification of a global detention reform 
outside of a country where the U.S. is actively engaged in hostilities is 
equally concerning. The global approach to executive detention authority 
led the Bush administration to pickup individuals far from any situation of 
armed conflict—including the streets of Bosnia, Thailand, Indonesia, Mau-
ritania and elsewhere—and to transfer them to Guantánamo. Continued 
assertion of the authority to take individuals into U.S. custody from any-
where in the world, outside of any law enforcement context, will threaten to 
undermine international standards for transfers of individuals across nation-
al borders. It would also set a dangerous example for other countries facing 
security threats. The American public would—rightfully—be outraged if 
foreign governments came into U.S. territory and took individuals into cus-
tody without affording them any domestic process. Presumably this is, in 
part, why at his confirmation hearing in January, now CIA Director Leon 
Panetta asserted that under his watch the CIA would not be transferring 
detainees to the custody of other governments or to black sites for the pur-
30 Richard Tomkins, Iraqi Detainee Numbers Lessen, UPI.COM, July 16, 2009, 
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2009/07/16/Iraqi-detainee-numbers-lessen/UPI-
42561247782916.
31 See Steven Lee Meyers, The Green Zone Takes Fire for a Second Day During Biden’s 
Visit to Baghdad, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2009, at A12. 
32 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Reported in Senate), S. 1547 
(June 5, 2007). 
33 Id. 
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pose of long-term detention without trial and interrogation.34
IV. INDEFINITELY KICKING THE CAN AND THE TRUE MEANING OF 
“PROLONGED” DETENTION
On the other 
hand, the establishment of a new authority or new procedures that continue 
to be based on the premise that the U.S. is rightfully engaged in a global 
detention enterprise will spark justified concerns that not only has the U.S. 
failed to resolve the legacy of Guantánamo, but it has left the door open for 
that legacy to be repeated in the future.
President Obama’s pledge to close the Guantánamo detention facili-
ty within one year implicitly acknowledges that absent a firm deadline the 
situation could fester indefinitely. In defending the administration’s decision 
to close Guantánamo, Secretary Gates asserted his commitment to confront-
ing the tough decisions that had to be made about detainee cases. Secretary 
Gates stated in January:
I believe that if we did not have a deadline, we could kick that can down 
the road endlessly . . . the only way we’ll come to grips with some of the 
tough decisions that have to be made with respect to Guantanamo is by 
having a deadline that then forces the rest of us to turn to and figure out 
solutions to some of these problems.35
But leaving a category of the Guantánamo detainees that are not charged or 
transferred in unending limbo will be, in effect, sidestepping the difficult 
issues and putting off the hard cases for potentially lifetimes.
After all, the Guantánamo detainees are being held in the context of 
a counterterrorism struggle without a foreseeable end. Given the indefinite 
nature of the current conflict some suggest that periodic review can cure the 
indefinite nature of continued detention of those in Guantánamo. But the 
detention authority being asserted by the administration and interpreted by 
the D.C. district court is one that is based on an evaluation of the detainees’
past acts. Hence, an individual’s detention status, as determined by either 
the administration or the courts, will not change so long as the conflict con-
tinues. Whether or not the Obama administration conducts a periodic review 
to consider the threat posed by or intelligence value of a detainee, as the 
Bush administration did with the Annual Review Boards at Guantánamo, 
the Obama administration is still asserting the legal authority to detain inde-
finitely.
34 Hearing Before the Sen. Select Comm. on Intelligence on the Nomination of Leon Pa-
netta to Be Director of the CIA (Feb. 5, 2009) (on file with author).
35 Testimony of Defense Secretary Robert Gates Before the H. Armed Services Comm.
(Jan. 27, 2009) (on file with author).
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The prohibition against indefinite detention is one of the most im-
portant principles governing detention under international humanitarian and 
international human rights law.36 In asserting the need for a new legal re-
gime to continue to detain without trial, Senator Lindsay Graham stated in 
May: “[T]his war is different. There will never be an end to this war. . . . An 
enemy combatant determination could be a de facto life sentence.”37
V. CONCLUSION
That 
Senator Graham, a influential member the Senate Armed Services Commit-
tee, contemplates a war without end in which the U.S. will hold detainees 
for the rest of their lives without trial sends a disturbing message about the 
indefinite nature of any continued detention of Guantánamo detainees with-
out trial, with or without periodic review. 
The detention policies pursued by the Bush administration at Guan-
tánamo were a costly mistake and President Obama set his administration 
on the right path on his second full day in office when he laid out a process 
for closing the detention facility. But if the administration continues to inde-
finitely detain without trial under a new scheme, it will risk simply transfer-
ring the problems caused by the Guantánamo detentions and perpetuating 
the detrimental impact on essential foreign policy and national security 
goals. Kicking Guantánamo cases down the road for continued, prolonged, 
and repeated review will impede the administration’s efforts to enlist the 
power of fundamental American values and to pursue a counterterrorism 
strategy that strengthens our ability to cooperate will U.S. allies. It will also 
impede the ability of the U.S. to advance democracy and the rule of law 
around the world. Only by firmly rejecting a policy of continued indefinite 
detention will the Obama administration be able to truly turn the page on 
Guantánamo.
36 Jelena Pejic, Procedural Principles and Safeguards for Internment/Administrative De-
tention in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 375, 
382 n.25 (2005) (citing Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, ¶ 60, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/2004/3 (Dec. 15, 2003) (“[I]n no event may an arrest based on emergency 
legislation last indefinitely . . . .”); ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1976, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.40. (“[T]he declaration of a state of 
emergency or a state of siege cannot serve as a pretext for the indefinite detention of individ-
uals, without any charge whatever. It is obvious that when these security measures are ex-
tended beyond a reasonable time they become true and serious violations of the right to free-
dom . . . .”).
37 115 CONG. REC. S5652 (daily ed. May 20, 2009) (statement of Sen. Graham).
